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Non-Technical Summary 
Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings 
dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed 
in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate 
governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of 
shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in 
the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and 
differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current 
trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper 
is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector. 
The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate 
governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a 
better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover 
market has been reduced in Continental Europe. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Eigentümerstrukturen unterscheiden sich deutlich in der EU. Während im 
Bankensektor in Kontinentaleuropa die Eigentümerstrukturen gewöhnlich stark 
konzentriert sind und von einem einzelnen Großaktionär dominiert werden, gibt es 
in Großbritannien eine Vielzahl kleinerer Aktionäre. Diese Unterschiede in der 
Eigentümerstruktur haben Auswirkungen auf die Corporate Governance im EU 
Bankensektor. Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die Wirksamkeit von Aktionären 
und feindlichen Übernahmen als Corporate Governance Mechanismus vor dem 
Hintergrund der rechtlichen und regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen in der EU und 
den Unterschieden in den Eigentümerstrukturen von Banken. Besondere 
Aufmerksamkeit liegt auf gegenwärtigen Trends in der Eigentümerstruktur von 
Banken (z.B. ausländische Staatsfonds). Die Studie basiert auf einem neuen 
Datensatz zu Eigentümeranteilen an börsennotierten Banken im EU Bankensektor. 
Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass EU Regulierungen nicht immer die 
Corporate Governance im Bankensektor verbessert haben. Während die 
Aktionärskontrolle durch den stärkeren Schutz der Rechte von 
Minderheitsaktionären verbessert werden konnte, ist die Effizienz feindlicher 
Übernahmen als Corporate Governance Mechanismus in Kontinentaleurope 
gesunken. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings 
dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely 
dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for 
corporate governance in the EU banking sector. In the United Kingdom, 
minority shareholders are more likely to be expropriated by the management as 
a result of the dispersed ownership structure in the banking sector. In 
Continental Europe, ownership is usually concentrated and agency problems 
arise between minority shareholders and large blockholders. Corporate 
governance deals with these problems. The recent bank failures in the United 
States and in Europe (e.g. Lehman Brothers in the United States, HBOS in the 
United Kingdom, Fortis in Belgium and IKB in Germany) have led to a renewed 
interest in the research on this issue.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the existing corporate governance structures 
in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment 
and differences in the ownership structure of banks. It is based on a new dataset 
on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the principal agent problem and 
identifies shareholder control and hostile takeovers as important corporate 
governance mechanisms. Since the nature of the principal-agent problem 
depends on the ownership structure of banks, Section 3 presents descriptive 
statistics on ownership structures in the EU banking sector. Based on the 
findings in this section, Section 4 analyzes the impact of EU corporate 
governance regulations on shareholder control and hostile takeovers. Section 5 
presents the main trends in ownership structure in the banking sector that might 
affect corporate governance in future (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). Section 6 
concludes. The results indicate that regulations have not always improved 
corporate governance in the EU banking sector. While shareholder control has 
been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the 
efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe. The 
main reason is that regulations on corporate governance fail to take account of 
differences in the ownership structures of banks across Continental Europe and 
the United Kingdom. 
2 Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance deals with principal-agent problems between managers 
and shareholders. Such problems arise because managers (agent) and 
shareholders (principal) have the incentive to maximize their personal utility 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since contracts cannot completely specify a priori 
what the manager has to do with the money and how the returns are divided 
between him and the shareholders, the manager has considerable scope to 
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increase his utility to the detriment of the shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1987). The shareholder can limit this by monitoring the management. However, 
given the information asymmetries between the management and the 
shareholders, each shareholder has to incur monitoring costs. For this reason, 
every shareholder will free-ride in the hope that other shareholders will do the 
monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This leaves the management with 
considerable discretion to divert corporate resources for their private benefits 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The corporate governance literature discusses different mechanisms to stop 
managers from increasing their utility. The most direct way to align the interest 
of the management and the shareholders is to concentrate shareholdings in the 
hands of one or more large blockholders. Blockholders have more voting rights 
and larger incentives to monitor the management than minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Ownership concentration might, however, come 
with some costs. The reason is that large shareholders represent their own 
interests which not need to coincide with the interests of the minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). As managers in the case of dispersed 
ownership, large shareholders have the incentive to extract private benefits that 
do not have to be shared with the other shareholders. It follows that concentrated 
ownership might reduce the principal-agent problem between the management 
and minority shareholders, but might create an agency problem between large 
and minority shareholders.  
Strong shareholder rights are one method to improve corporate governance. 
Another is to remove takeover defences and to improve the rights of the 
shareholders to sell their shares on the takeover market. Manne (1965) argues 
that the takeover market increases the power and the protection of shareholders. 
The reason is that the extraction of private benefits should lead to lower firm 
performance which should be reflected by a lower share price. The lower share 
price makes a firm more attractive for hostile takeovers (Manne, 1965). In a 
hostile takeover, a bidder makes a tender offer for the shares of the target firm. 
He, hence, deals directly with the shareholder of the target rather than with its 
management. After he has taken over an ownership stake that is large enough to 
assume control, the bidder removes the management against their will. Since the 
incumbent managers want to keep their jobs, they have larger incentives to 
manage the company in the interest of the shareholders if the probability of a 
hostile takeover is high.  
Active monitoring and hostile takeovers are two mechanisms that assure 
shareholders of getting a return on their investment. They belong to a set of 
corporate governance mechanisms. Such mechanisms can be seen as a device 
for making decisions that cannot be specified in the contract between the 
management and the shareholders owing to the incompleteness of contracts 
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(Hart, 1995). Other corporate governance mechanisms are large debt holders, 
incentive contracts and the implementation of a board of directors that controls 
the management in the interest of the minority shareholders. The latter 
mechanisms are not covered by this study. For a survey on these and other 
corporate governance mechanisms see Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
To summarize, depending on the ownership structure principal-agent problems 
differ. In case of dispersed ownership, agency problems exist between the 
management and the minority shareholders. In case of concentrated ownership, 
principal-agent problems arise between the blockholder and the minority 
shareholders, because blockholders have the incentive to maximize their utility 
at the expense of the minority shareholders. These agency problems are more 
severe in the banking sector than in the non-financial sector. The reason is that 
information asymmetries are larger in the banking sector than in the non-
financial sector (Levine, 2003). This makes monitoring more difficult and 
increases the free-riding problem, since minority shareholders have to incur 
larger monitoring costs to overcome their informational disadvantage. It follows 
that owing to the large information asymmetries bank managers have more 
scope to divert corporate resources for private benefits. Bank regulations further 
aggravate agency problems in the banking sector. The existence of deposit 
insurance, for example, increases the incentive of shareholders to engage in 
excessive risk-taking (Prowse, 1995; Macey and O’Hara, 2003). The problem is 
further aggravated by the fact that deposit insurance removes any incentive that 
insured depositors have to monitor the management because their funds are 
protected regardless of the outcomes of the investment strategies the bank 
selects (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). This means that deposit insurance increases 
both the incentive of shareholders and their ability to take on excessive risks 
(Levine, 2003).  
Although agency problems are more severe in the banking sector, the literature 
on corporate governance usually focuses on the non-financial sector.1 The aim 
of this paper is to fill this gap and to analyze the existing corporate governance 
structures in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory 
environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Corporate 
governance seems to be particularly relevant in the moment, since the ongoing 
crisis on the international financial markets has led to the failure of several 
banks and has considerably reduced bank valuations and shareholder value 
across the globe. Corporate governance issues are, however, not only relevant 
for bank shareholders. Owing to the importance of banks in mobilizing and 
                                           
1  A large part of this literature has been contributed by the European Corporate Governance 
Network. Becht and Röell (1999) provide a summary of the main findings of this network. 
For individual country studies see Becht and Böhmer (1999), Becht et al. (1999), Bianchi 
et al. (1999), Bloch and Kremp (1999), Crespí-Cladera and Garcia-Cestona (1999), De 
Jong et al. (1999), Goergen and Renneborg (1999) and Gugler et al. (1999). 
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allocating funds and risks, corporate governance in the banking sector is an 
important determinant for the whole economy (Levine, 1997 and 2005; 
Claessens, 2006). Since corporate governance deals with principal-agent 
problems, the next section presents descriptive statistics on the ownership and 
control structures in the EU banking sector. The aim of this section is to find out 
if agency problems between minority shareholders and bank managers are more 
severe than between minority shareholders and large blockholders and vice 
versa. Based on the findings in this section, Section 4 analyzes the impact of 
regulations that aim at improving shareholder control and facilitating hostile 
takeovers on corporate governance in the EU banking sector. Section 5 presents 
some trends in the ownership structure of banks that will likely affect corporate 
governance in future. Section 6 concludes. 
3 Data 
The study is based on a new dataset on the ownership structure of listed banks in 
the EU banking sector. Information on bank shareholdings comes from the 2008 
BankScope database of Bureau van Dijk. The dataset includes 178 listed banks 
from France (40), Germany (36), Italy (35), Spain (14) and the United Kingdom 
(53). A list of the banks included in the sample is provided in Table 1. The 
distribution of banks by country is shown in Table 2 and according to bank type 
in Table 3. All tables are reported in the Appendix. The dataset includes 
commercial banks (62), bank holding companies (17), cooperative banks (23), 
investment banks (27), Islamic banks (1), medium and long term credit banks 
(4), non-banking credit institution (39), as well as real estate and mortgage 
banks (5).  
The distribution of shareholdings is presented in Table 2 and 3 as well. The 
United Kingdom records 2.558 shareholdings in listed banks in 2008. This is 
considerably larger than in France (487), Germany (491), Italy (927) and Spain 
(927) and indicates that ownership is more dispersed in the United Kingdom 
than in Continental Europe. This is also reflected by the average number of 
shareholdings per bank. The United Kingdom records 48.26 shareholdings per 
bank. This is lower than in Spain where 56.29 shareholdings per bank are 
reported, but still considerably larger than in France (12.18), Italy (26.49) and 
Germany (13.64). A detailed presentation of the number of shareholdings per 
bank is provided in Table 1. 
3.1 Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is usually measured by the size of the largest 
blockholding (Becht and Röell, 1999 and other studies of the European 
Corporate Governance Network). The largest blockholding is defined as the 
largest direct or indirect stake that an individual shareholder or group of 
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shareholders has. Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the largest 
blockholding in EU banks. Since some banks have more than one largest 
blockholder if the largest shareholding is identical, the number of largest 
blockholdings is larger than the number of banks in the sample. Table 4 
indicates significant differences in ownership structures between the United 
Kingdom and Continental Europe. While the median largest blockholding is 
11.09 percent in the United Kingdom, it is 47.23 percent in Continental Europe. 
This means that in France, Germany, Italy and Spain every second bank is 
dominated by a blockholder that has almost outright control. In the United 
Kingdom, ownership is much less concentrated and the largest blockholder 
needs the second, third and fourth largest shareholder to have at least a blocking 
majority of 25 percent. These differences in ownership structure have 
implications for the corporate governance of banks. In Continental Europe, 
owing to the high degree of ownership concentration principal-agent problems 
between the blockholder and the minority shareholders should be more severe 
than between the management and minority shareholders. The opposite is the 
case in the United Kingdom. British banks are controlled by the management, 
since the largest blockholder alone cannot control the company. He must form a 
coalition with other large investors to have at least a blocking minority. This 
suggests that in the United Kingdom agency problems between the management 
and the minority shareholders are more severe than between large blockholders 
and the minority shareholders. The same differences in ownership structure have 
been found for the non-financial sector in Europe (Becht and Röell, 1999).  
Table 4: Largest blockholding 
Continental Europe Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Largest voting block 133 45.62 47.23 29.08 
2nd largest voting block 125 15.62 10.00 17.60 
3rd largest voting block 115 7.33 5.10 8.55 
4th largest voting block 108 4.39 3.01 4.43 
5th largest voting block 99 3.18 2.29 3.36 
United Kingdom Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Largest voting block 59 14.03 11.09 11.45 
2nd largest voting block 52 9.89 7.80 6.44 
3rd largest voting block 54 7.56 5.85 4.09 
4th largest voting block 50 6.18 5.08 3.19 
5th largest voting block 57 4.49 4.70 2.71 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Note: Continental Europe includes France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. 
Table 5 reports the relative importance of nine categories of blockholders. 
Measured by the number of largest blockholdings banks are the most important 
blockholder on the European continent. They have a median largest 
blockholding of 63.52 percent. The second most important category of 
shareholders are industrial companies. The median size of their blockholding is 
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40.45 percent. In the United Kingdom, financial and insurance companies are 
the most important category of shareholders. They have a median largest 
blockholding of 10.75 percent. Mutual and pension funds are the second most 
important category of shareholders. The median size of their largest 
blockholding is 16.36 percent. Continental Europe and the United Kingdom, 
hence, not only differ in terms of ownership concentration, but also in terms of 
the type of the largest blockholder. On the European continent, banks are the 
most important blockholder. This might, on the one hand, be desirable because 
they might be better able to monitor and control other banks than other investors 
owing to their knowledge about the business. On the other hand, if banks have 
close business links with the bank they control, they might be more inclined not 
to oppose the management in order to maintain current business links and to 
keep business going. Large block holdings of banks in other banks, hence, not 
necessarily improve monitoring and control to the benefit of minority 
shareholders. The same line of argument holds for industrial companies. If 
industrial companies are the largest blockholder, they might be more inclined to 
exploit their close relationship to obtain cheap funds. 
In the United Kingdom, financial & insurance companies and mutual & pension 
funds are the most important blockholder. Pension or mutual funds managers 
might be the better monitor than banks and financial & insurance companies, 
since fund managers are less likely to be entrenched than shareholders that have 
close business links with the bank they own. The problem with mutual or 
pension fund managers is that they do not have a direct stake in the bank and, 
hence, face lower incentives to monitor the management. Institutional ownership 
might, furthermore, sometimes bring too much short-sightedness to the bank, 
since institutional investors want the highest return from the company to retain 
their shareholders. This suggests that the principal-agent problems between 
managers and minority shareholders that arise in the United Kingdom owing to 
the dispersed ownership structure of banks might at least partly be reduced by 
the monitoring and control activities of mutual & pension funds. In Continental 
Europe, in contrast, agency problems between the largest blockholder and the 
minority shareholders might have become more severe as a result of potential 
business links between the blockholder and the bank he controls. These 
problems might alleviated by the increasing importance of institutional investors 
in Continental Europe and the United Kingdom (see also Section 5). 
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Table 5: Largest blockholding by shareholder type 
Continental Europe Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Bank 56 55.06 63.52 31.33 
Financial & Insurance Companies 16 42.36 52.05 26.07 
Employees/Managers, Self-Owned 1 11.56 11.56 . 
Individual(s) or family(ies)" 13 35.59 40.15 22.15 
Industrial Companies 28 43.10 40.45 25.21 
State, Public authority 1 92.73 92.73 . 
Foundation/Research Institute 5 28.88 41. 01 23.71 
Mutual & Pension fund/Trust/Nominee 7 8.40 9.31 7.69 
Other 6 54.92 55.00 6.06 
United Kingdom Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Bank 7 10.71 9.89 6.16 
Financial & Insurance Companies 21 10.39 10.75 4.99 
Employees/Managers, Self-Owned 1 14.53 14.53 . 
Individual(s) or family(ies) 9 14.80 17.12 17.26 
Industrial Companies 9 17.81 14.42 12.05 
State, Public authority - - - - 
Foundation/Research Institute - - - - 
Mutual & Pension fund/Trust/Nominee 12 18.09 16.36 15.26 
Other - - - - 
Source: Bankscope (2008). Note: Continental Europe includes France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. 
3.2 Ownership Structures 
A more detailed look at the ownership concentration in the EU banking sector 
gives Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the largest blockholdings in 
Continental Europe and the United Kingdom. The quantile plots confirm our 
previous conclusions regarding the ownership structure of banks in Continental 
Europe and the United Kingdom. In Continental Europe, ownership in the 
banking sector is concentrated and the largest blockholder has at least a simple 
majority in every second bank.2 In the United Kingdom, in contrast, ownership 
is widely dispersed with the blockholder usually having a stake of less than 25 
percent.  
Figure 1 reveals some interesting patterns about the distribution of 
blockholdings in listed banks in the EU. In Continental Europe, a clustering of 
blockholdings is visible at the 25 and 50 percent level. Such block holdings are 
necessary to have a blocking minority and a simple majority, respectively. In the 
United Kingdom, the largest blockholding is usually lower than the 30 percent 
threshold that requires a mandatory bid to all shareholders in case of a takeover. 
The mandatory bid rule, hence, effectively ensures that the growth of 
blockholdings stops short of the 30 percent level in most banks. The same can 
                                           
2  Quantile plots for individual member countries are presented in Figure 2 in the Appendix. 
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be found for the non-financial sector in the United Kingdom (Becht and Röell, 
1999). In the next section, we will analyze the effect of the mandatory bid rule 
and other regulations on corporate governance against the background of 
different ownership structures in the EU banking sector. 
Figure 1: Distribution of the largest blockholding in the EU banking sector 
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Source: Bankscope (2008). Note: Continental Europe includes France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain. The horizontal lines indicate the 10 (qualified holding), 25 (blocking minority), 30 
(mandatory bid), 50 (simple majority), 75 (super majority) and 90 percent (squeeze-out) 
threshold. 
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4 Corporate Governance Regulation in the EU 
To improve corporate governance in the EU, the Commission has adopted 
several directives over the past years. Improving of corporate governance is 
deemed a necessary response of the growing trend for European companies to 
operate cross-border in the internal market, the continuing integration of 
European capital markets and the rapid development of new information and 
communication technologies (Winter et. al, 2002). A reform of corporate 
governance in the EU was also deemed necessary owing to the damaging impact 
of financial scandals like that of Parmalat that collapsed at the end of 2003 and 
forced the management to seek bankruptcy protection. As a result of the recent 
bank failures in Europe and the US following the financial market crisis 
corporate governance regulation is expected to become more important again in 
the next years. 
The current corporate governance legislation in the EU has mainly been shaped 
by the 2002 report of the High Level Group (Winter et. al, 2002). It has resulted 
in an action plan that was adopted by the EU Commission in 2004. In the 
following, we will only present those directives we deem as particularly relevant 
for corporate governance and the ownership structure of banks. 
4.1 Transparency and Shareholder Directive  
The transparency directive 2004/109/EC (amended by directive 2007/14/EC) 
was adopted in 2004 following the proposals of the Winter Commission to 
harmonise market transparency in the EU. The directive aims at protecting 
minority shareholder rights by setting minimum transparency requirements. The 
requirements regard not only the publication of periodic financial information, 
but also the notification of the acquisition and disposal of major shareholdings. 
The directive requires shareholders to notify the issuer about the proportion of 
their voting rights once the latter exceeds 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 and 75 percent 
as a result of the acquisition or disposal of shareholdings (Art. 9, p. 1). The 
reporting requirement not only includes voting rights that are directly held by 
the investor, but also those that are indirectly held by a third party (Art. 10, p. 1). 
The disclosure requirement aims at increasing transparency and making the 
monitoring of large shareholders by regulators, minority shareholders and the 
market easier in order to avoid that large blockholders use their power to extract 
private benefits at the expense of other shareholders (Goergen et al., 2005). 
While the transparency directive has increased investor protection, it has also 
reduced the efficiency of the takeover market. The reason is that the disclosure 
of majority shareholdings might alert the market that a bid is likely to take place. 
This drives up the share price. If the shareholders expect the bidder to raise the 
efficiency of the firm, they will not tender their shares unless the share price 
offered by the bidder reflects the full efficiency gains from the takeover 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980). It follows that the bidder will withdraw his offer 
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since he does not make any profits under these conditions. One solution to this 
problem is that the bidder is allowed to extract private benefits after the takeover 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980).3 Another is to build up a toehold in the target before 
the official takeover bid is launched (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The toehold 
allows the bidder to make a profit, since he gains on the shares he already owns. 
Hostile takeovers are, hence, more likely to take place if the bidder has a toehold 
in the target.4 Critical is the level at which the toehold has to be disclosed. If the 
disclosure level is low and the bidder is not able to acquire a large blockholding, 
the threat of a hostile takeover will be low. This suggests that the transparency 
directive while improving shareholder control through better investor protection 
has reduced the efficiency of the takeover market as disciplining device for the 
management of banks.  
The power of minority shareholders will be further strengthened by the directive 
2007/36/EC on shareholder rights. This directive introduces minimum standards 
to ensure that shareholders have a timely access to the relevant information 
ahead of the general meeting and simple means to vote at a distance. The 
directive, therefore, particularly affects blockholders that do not have outright 
control over the company and depend on the absence of minority shareholders 
on the general meeting to have de facto control. It has to be transposed into 
national law until 2009. The shareholder rights and transparency directive make 
concentrated ownership less attractive, since the better protection of minority 
shareholder rights improves shareholder control and reduces the scope of large 
blockholders to extract private benefits to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. The attractiveness of large blockholdings is further reduced by the 
disclosure requirement, since it lowers the ability of potential bidders to acquire 
large toeholds without the awareness of the remaining minority shareholders. 
This should reduce the threat of a hostile takeover in the EU banking market. 
While the effect of the shareholder directive has improved corporate 
governance, the effect of the transparency directive on corporate governance is, 
therefore, not clear a priori. For a summary of the effects of the transparency 
and shareholder directive on the ownership structure of a bank, the takeover 
market and investor protection see Table 6 in the Appendix. In the next section, 
                                           
3  Grossman and Hart (1980) call this ‘dilution’. One method is for shareholders to permit a 
successful bidder to sell the firm’s assets or output to another company owned by the 
bidder at terms which are disadvantageous to minority shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 
1980). Dilution of minority shareholders is expected to raise the threat of hostile takeover, 
since it excludes the shareholders that are not tendering from completely sharing in the 
benefits of improving the corporation after the takeover. Grossman and Hart (1980) show 
that dilution is under certain conditions beneficial for the minority shareholder as well, 
since the threat of a hostile takeover forces the management to be more efficient.  
4  Toeholds also lower the chance of entry of a rival bidder and reduce managerial resistance 
against a takeover (Betton and Eckbo, 2000). For more on this issue see also Bulow et al. 
(1999). 
 10
we shall analyze the effect of the takeover directive on corporate governance in 
the EU.  
4.2 Takeover Directive 
The takeover directive 2004/25/EC was adopted in 2004 and had to be 
implemented in national law until 2006. The adoption of the directive set an end 
to a more than 30 year old discussion about the introduction of common 
takeover rules in the EU. The directive has two major goals. On the one hand, 
the introduction of common rules for takeovers in the EU should improve the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control and make it a more effective 
corporate governance mechanism. The takeover directive particularly aims at 
improving the efficiency of the takeover market in Continental Europe, since the 
market for corporate control is generally assumed to be active in the United 
Kingdom. On the other hand, the aim of the directive is to increase the 
protection of minority shareholders in the case of a takeover.  
The main changes of the directive are the introduction of a mandatory bid rule, a 
squeeze-out/sell-out rule, a board neutrality rule and a breakthrough rule. While 
the mandatory bid rule and sell-out rule aim at increasing investor protection, 
the aim of the squeeze-out rule, the board neutrality and the breakthrough rule is 
to facilitate takeovers. In the following, each of these rules and their impact on 
corporate governance in the banking sector will be discussed in greater detail. 
? The Mandatory Bid Rule 
The mandatory bid rule obliges an investor to make a full takeover bid for all 
remaining voting shares of listed banks once he has taken over a blockholding 
that directly or indirectly gives him de facto control over the acquired company 
(Art. 5, p. 1). A mandatory bid is only required if the bidder makes a takeover 
bid to a single shareholder or a group of shareholders in a privately negotiated 
deal. If he makes a voluntary offer for all shares of all shareholders, the 
mandatory bid rule does not apply (Art. 5, p. 2). De facto control is assumed if 
the number of voting shares exceeds particular thresholds. Although the EU 
Commission has left the member countries with considerably leeway in 
implementing the directive (Art. 5, p. 3), there is considerable homogeneity in 
mandatory bid thresholds among EU member countries. This is reflected in 
Table 7. Most common is the 30 percent mandatory bid threshold which is 
applied in Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom. Germany and France set the 
threshold at 33 percent. The impact of the mandatory bid rule on the ownership 
structure of banks becomes visible in the United Kingdom where most of the 
largest blockholdings stop short of 30 percent (see Figure 1).  
The mandatory bid rule aims at protecting minority shareholders by granting 
them the right to sell their shares in the event of a change of control (EU 
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Commission, 2007). Minority shareholder rights are protected, since the 
blockholder might use his controlling position to increase his private benefits at 
the expense of the minority shareholder after the takeover. While the mandatory 
bid rule increases investor protection in case of a takeover, it at the same time, 
reduces the likelihood of a takeover. The reason is that the equal treatment 
principle requires that the remaining investors have to be paid the same price for 
their shares as the selling blockholder (Art. 5, p. 4). Since the selling 
blockholder generally receives a premium for the sale of a control block, the 
mandatory bid rule drives up the price per share and makes takeovers more 
costly. The bidder might only be willing to pay the higher price if he expects to 
create sufficient added value that compensates for the higher share price 
(Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003). Since takeovers require an even higher added 
value if the minority shareholders have to be paid the same price as the 
incumbent blockholder, the mandatory bid rule prevents value decreasing 
transactions (Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003). It, however, at the same time reduces 
the bidder’s willingness to take over a bank, even though the control transfer 
would add value (Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003).  
Table 7: Mandatory-bid, squeeze-out and sell-out thresholds 
Country Mandatory-bid threshold Squeeze-out threshold
Sell-out 
threshold 
Austria 30% 90% 90% 
Belgium 30% 95% 95% 
Finland 30% 90% 90% 
France 33% 95% 95% 
Germany 30% 95% 95% 
Greece 33% 90% 90% 
Ireland 30% 90% 90% 
Italy 30% 95% 95% 
Luxembourg 33% 95% 95% 
Netherlands 30% 95% 95% 
Portugal 33% 90% 90% 
Spain 30% 90% 90% 
United Kingdom 30% 90% 90% 
Source: EU Commission (2007) 
Takeovers in the banking sector are particularly less likely in Continental 
Europe than in the United Kingdom. Since ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of a controlling blockholder on the European continent, the share price 
will increase owing to the block premium that has to be paid to the incumbent 
blockholder. This premium will drive up the total purchase price and reduce the 
attractiveness of a bank as a takeover target. If the bidder offers a smaller block 
premium to reduce the total purchase price, the incumbent blockholder will most 
likely not be appropriately compensated for the loss of the private benefits of 
control. This should reduce the likelihood that the incumbent blockholder 
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accepts the bid in Continental Europe. In the United Kingdom, the bidder does 
not have to pay a block premium because ownership is widely dispersed. 
Takeovers in such countries also usually do not take place through privately 
negotiated sales, but rather through a voluntary offer for all shares of all 
shareholders. The mandatory bid rule, hence, reinforces concentrated ownership 
structures and reduces the likelihood of a takeover particularly in those countries 
where the takeover directive aims at increasing it. In the United Kingdom, the 
mandatory bid rule will, in contrast, leave the ownership and control structure 
almost unaffected. Although the requirement to make a mandatory bid might 
reduce merger activity in the British banking sector providing managers with 
greater discretion, it is unlikely to result in a more concentrated ownership 
structure (Goergen et al., 2005). 
? The Board Neutrality Rule  
The board neutrality rule aims at facilitating hostile takeovers. It provides that 
during the bid period the board of the target company must obtain prior 
authorization from the general meeting of shareholders before the adoption post 
bid defences (Art. 9, p. 1). This rule should make hostile takeovers easier by 
limiting the board’s power to raise obstacles to hostile takeovers to the detriment 
of minority shareholders (EU Commission, 2007). Managers might use takeover 
defences, since the bidder likely replaces the management after the takeover. 
Since bidders usually target inefficiently managed banks in hostile takeovers, 
anti-takeover devices are likely to prevent value-enhancing acquisitions and 
harm shareholders. Examples for post-bid defences are share buybacks that aim 
at reducing the number of available shares the bidder could acquire or the 
issuance of share capital to increase the cost of the bid. They are put in place 
once a company has become subject to a takeover bid. Under the takeover 
directive the board is only allowed to search for an alternative bidder (‘white 
knight)’ (Art. 9, p. 1). The board of the target company shall, furthermore, draw 
up and make public a document setting out its opinion of the bid and the reasons 
on which it is based, including its views on the effects of implementation of the 
bid on all the company's interests and on the strategic plans of the incumbent 
management for the target company and their likely repercussions on 
employment and the locations of the company's places of business (Art. 9, p. 5). 
? The Breakthrough Rule  
The breakthrough rule also aims at facilitating hostile takeovers by enabling the 
bidder to break through existing takeover defences that make takeovers more 
difficult. While the board neutrality rule focuses on post-bid defences, the 
breakthrough rule aims at eliminating pre-bid defences (EU Commission, 2007). 
It divides the takeover process into two different phases. The first phase is the 
acquisition phase. During this phase the breakthrough rule eliminates defence 
mechanisms that aim at frustrating the bidder (Art. 11, p. 2 and 3). Examples for 
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such pre-bid defences are share transfer or voting restrictions. Such defences are 
still widespread and actively used in the EU (Shearman and Sterling, 2007). The 
breakthrough rule also applies to multiple voting shares (Art. 11, p. 3). The 
directive, however, requires that the holders of such rights should receive 
equitable compensation for any loss of voting power resulting from the 
breakthrough rule (Art. 11, p. 5). The second phase is the post-takeover phase. 
During this phase the breakthrough rule eliminates all defence mechanisms that 
prevent the restructuring of the target. It provides that once the bidder holds 75 
percent or more of the voting rights no restrictions on the transfer of securities or 
on voting rights nor any extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the 
appointment or removal of board members shall apply on the first general 
meeting of shareholders after the acquisition (Art. 11, p. 4).  
Particularly the latter provision has an impact on the ownership structure of 
banks. It implies that current controlling minority shareholders that own less 
than 25 percent of all shares lose their veto power over a control transfer. This 
should reduce the value of controlling blocks with less than 25 percent of the 
votes (Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003). Owing to the relatively large number of 
blockholdings below the 25 percent level this should particularly affect 
blockholders in Italy and Spain (see Figure 2). The loss will be reflected in 
smaller price differentials between shares with high voting powers and shares 
with low voting power and should manifest in a lower premium paid in block 
trades to the extent that transactions below the mandatory bid threshold continue 
to take place (Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003). Since an incumbent blockholder that 
owns less than 25 percent of the voting rights will not be appropriately 
compensated for the loss of private benefits in a block trade, he will likely adopt 
measures to frustrate the bidder. Provided that the incumbent blockholder is not 
financially constrained, one way is to increase his blockholding above the 25 
percent threshold. If the incumbent blockholder is financially constrained, an 
alternative is to approve defence mechanisms on the general meeting of the 
shareholders. By virtue of owing a blockholding, the controlling shareholder can 
de facto alone decide to frustrate a bid (Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003). 
Alternatively, the incumbent blockholder could form a control pyramid and 
enhance cross-shareholding structures (Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003). Those 
defensive mechanisms are not covered by the takeover directive although they 
are widespread in the EU (Shearman and Sterling, 2007). Bennedsen and 
Nielsen (2004), furthermore, point out that the introduction of the breakthrough 
rule might also have an impact on banks in which the controlling blockholder 
owns more than 25 percent of the capital. Since such blockholders are able to 
block the restructuring of the bank after the takeover, the likelihood of a 
takeover is smaller in such banks. This increases managerial entrenchment and 
might limit the ability of at least some companies to raise new capital and make 
the issuance of new shares more costly (Berglöf and Burkhart, 2003).  
 14
? The Squeeze-Out Rule/Sell-Out Rule 
The squeeze-out rule also affects the ownership structure of a bank. The 
squeeze-out rule allows bidders that have taken over a large part of capital to 
acquire the outstanding shares for a fair price (Art. 15, p. 2). Forcing out 
minority shareholders out of the bank should liberate the bidder from costs and 
risks which continued existence of minorities could trigger (EU Commission, 
2007). The squeeze-out rule also reduces the problem that minority shareholders 
will not tender their shares unless the share price offered by the bidder reflects 
the full efficiency gains from the takeover (Grossman and Hart, 1980). As 
argued in Section 4.1, this will drive up the share price and finally led to the 
withdrawal of the bid. The squeeze-out rule reduces this holdout problem 
because in case that a bid is conditional on the squeeze-out threshold 
shareholders cannot gain from not tendering their shares. This implies that they 
are willing to sell their shares for a price that is less than the post-takeover price 
(Goergen et al., 2005). It follows that the bidder is able to internalize more 
efficiency gains of the target after the takeover. The squeeze-out rule, hence, 
increases the incentive of the bidder to take over a bank and improves the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control. It steps in if ownership of the 
blockholder exceeds particular thresholds. The EU member countries are free to 
set this threshold between 90 and 95 percent (Art. 15, p. 1). This is reflected in 
Table 6. Most common is the 90 percent threshold which is used in Spain and 
the United Kingdom. France, Germany and Italy set the threshold at 95 percent. 
The counterpart of the squeeze-out rule is the sell-out rule. It provides minority 
shareholders the right to sell their shares to the blockholder once the latter has 
passed the sell-out threshold (Art. 16, p. 1). In contrast to the squeeze-out rule, 
the sell-out rule should reduce the likelihood of a takeover if the bidder is not 
interested in taking over all shares since it increases the total purchase price. 
While the squeeze-out rule aims at facilitating takeovers, the sell-out rule should 
protect minority shareholders from being expropriated by the blockholder after 
the takeover. Together they should lead to a complete takeover of all shares once 
the blockholder has passed the squeeze-out/sell-out threshold.  
To summarize, the takeover directive aims at facilitating hostile takeovers and 
protecting minority shareholders in the case of a takeover. While the directive 
has reached its aim to increase the protection of minority shareholders, it has 
failed to raise the likelihood of hostile takeovers in countries where ownership is 
concentrated. In countries with concentrated ownership, the introduction of the 
mandatory bid rule has rather reinforced existing ownership structures and 
increased managerial entrenchment. This is particularly the case in countries 
where the blockholders enjoys large private benefits of control. The positive 
effect of the squeeze-out on the takeover market has been cancelled out by the 
introduction of the sell-out rule. The breakthrough rule also fails to improve the 
efficiency of the takeover market in the EU banking sector. One reason is that 
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the incumbent blockholder is still able to approve defensive mechanisms in the 
general meeting if ownership is concentrated. He might also increase 
entrenchment by forming control pyramids. This is a reason of concern, since 
pyramid structures are the most widely used mechanism in the EU to separate 
ownership and control (Shearman and Sterling, 2007). Managerial entrenchment 
is also increased by the possibility of the member states to opt-out of the board 
neutrality and breakthrough rule (Art. 12, p. 1).  
Table 8: Adoption of the board neutrality and breakthrough rule 
  
Transposition 
of the takeover 
directive 
Board 
neutrality rule 
Breakthrough 
rule 
Reciprocity 
principle 
Austria yes adopted not adopted not adopted 
Belgium no not adopted not adopted adopted 
Finland yes adopted not adopted not adopted 
France yes adopted not adopted adopted 
Germany yes not adopted not adopted adopted 
Greece yes adopted not adopted adopted 
Ireland yes adopted not adopted not adopted 
Italy no not adopted not adopted adopted 
Luxembourg yes not adopted not adopted not adopted 
Netherlands no not adopted not adopted adopted 
Portugal yes adopted not adopted adopted 
Spain no adopted not adopted adopted 
United Kingdom yes adopted not adopted not adopted 
Source: EU Commission (2007).  
Table 8 shows that Germany and Italy have used this option. They neither apply 
the board neutrality nor the breakthrough rule. Where Member States make use 
of this option, companies have the right to opt-in and to apply the rules (Art. 12, 
p. 2). France and Spain only oblige their companies to apply the board neutrality 
rule, but not the breakthrough rule. They have, however, introduced the 
principal of reciprocity that allows them to exempt their companies from the 
board neutrality rule if the bidder does not apply the board neutrality rule 
himself (Art. 12, p. 3). This principal was introduced to prevent that a company 
that is not allowed to use defence mechanism is taken over by a company that is 
allowed to do so. It has undermined the introduction of the board neutrality rule 
in France and Spain. The United Kingdom also applies the board neutrality rule, 
but not the principle of reciprocity. The probability of a takeover is also reduced 
by the fact that the breakthrough rule does not apply to securities that confer 
special rights on the member states (‘golden shares’, Art. 11, p. 7). This should 
significantly reduce the likelihood of a takeover in countries where government 
ownership in the banking sector is high.  
The shortcomings of the takeover directive have been recognized by the EU 
Commission. In its report on the implementation of the takeover directive it 
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states that the board neutrality rule as implemented in the member states holds 
back the emergence of a market for corporate control (EU Commission, 2007). 
The Commission, furthermore, notes that it is unlikely that the breakthrough rule 
will bring significant benefits as implemented in the member states (EU 
Commission, 2007). It hopes that the directive will indirectly improve the 
conditions for hostile takeovers through the disclosure of takeover defences (EU 
Commission, 2007). If investors are aware of such defences, they might push the 
management to abolish them to reduce managerial entrenchment. That market 
forces might prevent the adoption of takeover defences is demonstrated by the 
United Kingdom. Although many devices to separate ownership and control are 
not prohibited, companies usually do not apply them (Shearman and Sterling, 
2007). 
5 Trends in Ownership and Corporate Governance in the 
EU Banking Sector 
The ownership structure in the EU banking sector has changed in the past years. 
In this section, we will present the main trends that will likely affect corporate 
governance in the banking sector in the future.  
5.1 Foreign and Institutional Investors 
The first trend is the larger number of foreign investors in the EU banking 
sector. Their importance has increased relatively to domestic investors in recent 
years (ECB, 2008). The second trend that has changed the ownership structure 
of banks is the growing importance of institutional investors. Institutional 
investors include mutual fund shares as well as insurance and pension funds. 
Those funds increasingly invest their funds in equity. There are, however, large 
differences across countries in the importance institutional investors. While in 
the United Kingdom funds invest a larger percentage of their portfolio in equity, 
portfolio composition is more diversified in Continental Europe (ECB, 2008). 
Both the larger presence of foreign and institutional investors will likely affect 
corporate governance in the EU banking sector in the future. The reason is that 
institutional investors have larger incentives to monitor and to control the 
management of bank. Institutional investors, for example, are more likely to 
collect the votes of other shareholders to push for corporate governance reforms 
(Gillian and Starks, 2000). Institutional ownership also reduces the agency 
problem between the controlling blockholder and the minority shareholder, since 
institutional investors aim at achieving the highest return from their investment 
and should act in line with the interest of minority shareholders. Institutional 
investors are also less likely to vote for defence mechanism to block hostile 
takeovers (Brickley et al., 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988). This should 
facilitate hostile takeovers and improve the efficiency of the market for 
corporate control. The greater importance of institutional investors should, 
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hence, improve corporate governance in the banking sector. Corporate 
governance should be even more effective if institutional investors are located 
abroad, since foreign investors should have a more distant relationship with the 
management of the company they control (ECB, 2008). This should raise the 
independence of the monitor and further enhance corporate governance in the 
EU banking sector. 
5.2 Sovereign Wealth Funds 
The third trend in the EU banking sector besides the larger presence of foreign 
and institutional investors is the increasing importance of sovereign wealth 
funds as bank shareholders. Owing to the large amount of currency reserves and 
the financial distress of many banks following the financial market crisis 
particularly sovereign wealth funds from the Asia and Middle East have become 
major shareholders in EU and US banks. For a list of shareholdings of sovereign 
wealth funds in the European banking sector see Table 9 in the Appendix. In the 
moment, sovereign wealth funds are active in Italy, Germany, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. To prevent that these funds acquire or increase their 
shareholdings in the banking sector, many member states plan to restrict the 
investment opportunities of such funds. France, for example, plans to set up a 
sovereign wealth fund to take over significant shareholdings in troubled French 
companies in order to prevent that a foreign sovereign wealth fund acquires a 
stake in domestic companies (Hall, 2008). The Italian government also plans to 
impose restrictions on the ownership of domestic companies by sovereign 
wealth funds. The plan foresees not only to limit stakes of sovereign wealth 
funds in Italian companies to 5 percent, it should also allow the board of 
directors to adopt defence mechanism to fend off hostile takeovers without the 
approval of the general meeting (Dinmore, 2008). These and other measures by 
member countries might undermine corporate governance regulation in the EU 
and might lead to new barriers to takeovers in the EU banking sector not only 
for sovereign wealth funds, but also for other investors. Owing to the 
disciplining role of hostile takeovers for bank managers this could have a 
negative impact on corporate governance. 
6 Conclusions 
Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While in Continental Europe 
large blockholdings dominate, ownership is widely dispersed in the United 
Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in EU 
banking sector. While in the United Kingdom, principal-agent problems arise 
between the management and minority shareholders as a result of the dispersed 
ownership structure in the banking sector, ownership is concentrated in 
Continental Europe and agency problems generally arise between small 
shareholders and large blockholders. Corporate governance deals with these 
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problems. The aim of this paper was to analyze the existing corporate 
governance structures in the EU banking sector against the background of the 
regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. 
Table 6 in the Appendix provides a summary on the effect of the EU directives 
discussed in this paper on the ownership structure of a bank, the takeover market 
and investor protection.  
The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate 
governance in the banking sector. While the transparency and the shareholder 
directive have improved the protection of minority shareholders by raising 
transparency and facilitating distant voting, the transparency directive has 
reduced the efficiency of the takeover market. This illustrates the trade-off 
between better investor protection and higher efficiency of the market for 
corporate control that is characteristics for corporate governance regulation in 
the EU. The same trade-off characterizes the takeover directive. While the 
squeeze-out rule has increased the efficiency of the market for corporate control, 
the sell-out rule has reduced it. Another problem of corporate governance 
regulations in the EU is that it fails to take account of the differences in the 
ownership structure of banks in Continental Europe and the United Kingdom. 
This has been demonstrated by the mandatory bid rule. While it fails to have an 
effect on takeover activity in countries with dispersed ownership (United 
Kingdom), it has increased managerial entrenchment in countries with 
concentrated ownership (Continental Europe). The consequence is that the 
mandatory bid rule has reduced the efficiency of the market for corporate 
control particularly in those countries in the EU where it aims at increasing it. 
The efficiency of the takeover market is further reduced by the fact that many 
countries do not apply the breakthrough rule and board neutrality rule or 
circumvent it by applying the principle of reciprocity. One reason is that 
member states are still very protectionist and want to protect domestic industries 
from by taken over by foreign investors. This has recently become visible in the 
debate on sovereign wealth funds from the Asia and Middle East. To prevent 
that such funds are able to acquire significant shareholdings in major companies, 
many EU member countries plan to adopt measures that restrict the investment 
opportunities of such funds. This might lead to the re-introduction of anti-
takeover defences and other barriers to takeovers in the EU banking sector not 
only for sovereign wealth funds, but also for other investors. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: List of banks and shareholdings 
France Frequency Percent Cumulative 
ABC Arbitrage 13 2.67 2.67 
Affine 24 4.93 7.6 
Altarea 14 2.87 10.47 
BNP Paribas 85 17.45 27.93 
Banque Tarneaud 2 0.41 28.34 
Banque de Savoie 1 0.21 28.54 
Banque de la Réunion 1 0.21 28.75 
Bourse Direct 10 2.05 30.8 
Boursorama 19 3.9 34.7 
CFCAL Banque-Crédit Foncier et Communal 4 0.82 35.52 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mut 1 0.21 35.73 
Cofitem - Cofimur 25 5.13 40.86 
Compagnie Financière Martin-Maurel 6 1.23 42.09 
Credit Agricole Alpes Provence-Caisse r 1 0.21 42.3 
Credit Agricole Centre Loire-Caisse Reg 1 0.21 42.51 
Credit Agricole Sud Rhône Alpes-Caisse 4 0.82 43.33 
Credit Agricole de la Touraine et du Po 1 0.21 43.53 
Crédit Agricole Atlantique Vendée-Caiss 2 0.41 43.94 
Crédit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire-Caiss 4 0.82 44.76 
Crédit Agricole Nord de France-Caisse r 2 0.41 45.17 
Crédit Agricole S.A. 37 7.6 52.77 
Crédit Agricole d'Aquitaine-Caisse régi 1 0.21 52.98 
Crédit Agricole d'Ile-de-France-Caisse 1 0.21 53.18 
Crédit Agricole de Toulouse et du Midi 1 0.21 53.39 
Crédit Agricole de l'Ille-et-Vilaine-Ca 3 0.62 54 
Crédit Agricole du Morbihan-Caisse régi 3 0.62 54.62 
Crédit Industriel et Commercial - CIC 15 3.08 57.7 
Eurosic 23 4.72 62.42 
FALA 4 0.82 63.24 
I.R.D. Nord Pas-de-Calais-Institut Régi 10 2.05 65.3 
Initiative & Finance Investissement SA 3 0.62 65.91 
Locindus 17 3.49 69.4 
Natixis 21 4.31 73.72 
SDR Bretagne 21 4.31 78.03 
SIIC de PARIS 7 1.44 79.47 
SIIC de PARIS 8ème 9 1.85 81.31 
Société Générale 62 12.73 94.05 
Société financière pour le financement 7 1.44 95.48 
Union Financière de France Banque 14 2.87 98.36 
Viel & Compagnie 8 1.64 100.00 
Total 487 100.00 100.00 
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Germany Frequency Percent Cumulative 
AXG Investmentbank AG 2 0.41 0.41 
Aareal Bank AG 41 8.35 8.76 
Ahag Wertpapierhandelsbank AG 3 0.61 9.37 
Baader Wertpapierhandelsbank AG 10 2.04 11.41 
Bankverein Werther AG 1 0.2 11.61 
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG 3 0.61 12.22 
Berlin Hyp-Berlin-Hannoverschen Hypothe 5 1.02 13.24 
Comdirect Bank AG 13 2.65 15.89 
Commerzbank AG 67 13.65 29.53 
Concord Investmentbank AG 9 1.83 31.36 
DAB Bank AG 15 3.05 34.42 
DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengesellschaft 16 3.26 37.68 
DVB Bank AG 3 0.61 38.29 
Deutsche Bank AG 53 10.79 49.08 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesells 7 1.43 50.51 
Deutsche Postbank AG 42 8.55 59.06 
Eurohypo AG 3 0.61 59.67 
GFKL Financial Services AG 4 0.81 60.49 
GRENKELEASING AG 23 4.68 65.17 
Gebhard Bank-Gebhard & Co. Wertpapierha 5 1.02 66.19 
Gontard & Metallbank AG 8 1.63 67.82 
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG 4 0.81 68.64 
Hornblower Fischer AG 2 0.41 69.04 
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG 78 15.89 84.93 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG 9 1.83 86.76 
LBB Holding AG-Landesbank Berlin Holdin 2 0.41 87.17 
Merkur-Bank KGaA 2 0.41 87.58 
NORDAKTIENBANK AG 6 1.22 88.8 
Sino AG 11 2.24 91.04 
Tradegate AG Wertpapierhandelsbank 3 0.61 91.65 
UmweltBank AG 3 0.61 92.26 
VEM Aktienbank AG 5 1.02 93.28 
Varengold Wertpapierhandelsbank AG 7 1.43 94.7 
Wüstenrot & Württembergische 10 2.04 96.74 
mwb Wertpapierhandelsbank AG 9 1.83 98.57 
quirin bank AG 7 1.43 100.00 
Total 491 100.00 100.00 
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Italy Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Anima S.G.R.p.A 14 1.51 1.51 
Apulia ProntoPrestito SpA 8 0.86 2.37 
Azimut Holding SpA 72 7.77 10.14 
Banca Carige SpA 17 1.83 11.97 
Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA 12 1.29 13.27 
Banca Ifis SpA 15 1.62 14.89 
Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e 17 1.83 16.72 
Banca Italease SpA 40 4.31 21.04 
Banca Popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio 14 1.51 22.55 
Banca Popolare di Intra SpA 13 1.4 23.95 
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL 66 7.12 31.07 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Coope 1 0.11 31.18 
Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA 13 1.4 32.58 
Banca Profilo SpA 21 2.27 34.84 
Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna 3 0.32 35.17 
Banco Desio - Banco di Desio e della Br 18 1.94 37.11 
Banco Popolare 44 4.75 41.86 
Banco di Sardegna SpA 4 0.43 42.29 
CREDEM-Credito Emiliano SpA 21 2.27 44.55 
Conafi Prestito SpA 28 3.02 47.57 
Credito Artigiano 5 0.54 48.11 
Credito Bergamasco 3 0.32 48.44 
Credito Valtellinese SCarl 13 1.4 49.84 
Generbanca-Banca Generali SpA 14 1.51 51.35 
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena-Banca 32 3.45 54.8 
IFI - Instituto Finanziario Industriale 33 3.56 58.36 
IW Bank SpA 14 1.51 59.87 
Intesa Sanpaolo 87 9.39 69.26 
Mediobanca SpA 88 9.49 78.75 
Meliorbanca SpA-Meliorbanca Group 19 2.05 80.8 
Mittel SpA 11 1.19 81.98 
Toscana Finanza SpA 23 2.48 84.47 
UBI Banca - Proforma-Unione di Banche I 36 3.88 88.35 
UniCredito Italiano SpA 91 9.82 98.17 
iNTEk SpA 17 1.83 100.00 
Total 927 100.00 100.00 
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Spain Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 183 23.22 23.22 
Banco Espanol de Crédito SA, BANESTO 43 5.46 28.68 
Banco Guipuzcoano SA 40 5.08 33.76 
Banco Pastor SA 51 6.47 40.23 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 94 11.93 52.16 
Banco Santander SA 178 22.59 74.75 
Banco de Andalucia SA 10 1.27 76.02 
Banco de Castilla SA 8 1.02 77.03 
Banco de Crédito Balear SA 10 1.27 78.3 
Banco de Galicia SA 6 0.76 79.06 
Banco de Sabadell SA 62 7.87 86.93 
Banco de Valencia SA 39 4.95 91.88 
Banco de Vasconia SA 7 0.89 92.77 
Bankinter SA 57 7.23 100.00 
Total 788 100.00 100.00 
 
 
United Kingdom Frequency Percent Cumulative 
3i Group plc 94 3.67 3.67 
Aberdeen Asset Management Plc 97 3.79 7.47 
Alliance & Leicester Plc 67 2.62 10.09 
Alliance Trust Plc 21 0.82 10.91 
Arbuthnot Banking Group Plc 46 1.8 12.71 
Baillie Gifford Japan Trust Plc (The) 16 0.63 13.33 
Baillie Gifford Shin Nippon Plc 15 0.59 13.92 
Bankers Investment Trust Plc 9 0.35 14.27 
Barclays Plc 99 3.87 18.14 
Bradford & Bingley Plc 67 2.62 20.76 
Brewin Dolphin Holdings Plc 73 2.85 23.61 
British Assets Trust Plc 17 0.66 24.28 
Cattles Plc 99 3.87 28.15 
Close Brothers Group Plc 84 3.28 31.43 
Dunedin Enterprise Investment Trust plc 21 0.82 32.25 
Dunedin Smaller Companies Investment Tr 10 0.39 32.64 
Edinburgh Investment Trust Plc (The) 17 0.66 33.31 
Edinburgh Worldwide Investment Trust Pl 14 0.55 33.85 
Electra Private Equity Plc 17 0.66 34.52 
Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust Plc 15 0.59 35.11 
HBOS Plc 91 3.56 38.66 
HSBC Holdings Plc 72 2.81 41.48 
ICAP Plc 92 3.6 45.07 
Intermediate Capital Group Plc 91 3.56 48.63 
Investec Plc 87 3.4 52.03 
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc 22 0.86 52.89 
Jupiter Primadona Growth Trust Plc 25 0.98 53.87 
Lloyds TSB Group Plc 112 4.38 58.25 
London Scottish Bank Plc 66 2.58 60.83 
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United Kingdom Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Man Group Plc 113 4.42 65.25 
Mercantile Investment Trust plc (The) 16 0.63 65.87 
Mid Wynd International Investment 1 0.04 65.91 
Monks Investment Trust Plc 6 0.23 66.15 
Murray International Trust Plc 15 0.59 66.73 
Northern 3 VCT Plc 1 0.04 66.77 
Northern Aim VCT Plc 1 0.04 66.81 
Northern Investors Company Plc 28 1.09 67.9 
Northern Venture Trust Plc 2 0.08 67.98 
Pacific Horizon Investment Trust plc 12 0.47 68.45 
Paragon Group of Companies Plc 78 3.05 71.5 
Polar Capital Technology Trust Plc 13 0.51 72.01 
Provident Financial Plc 93 3.64 75.65 
RIT Capital Partners Plc 9 0.35 76 
Rathbone Brothers Plc 99 3.87 79.87 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) 135 5.28 85.14 
Schroders Plc 91 3.56 88.7 
Scottish Investment Trust Plc 19 0.74 89.44 
Scottish Mortgage Investment Trust Plc 13 0.51 89.95 
Standard Chartered Plc 118 4.61 94.57 
Throgmorton Trust PLC 20 0.78 95.35 
Tullett Prebon Plc 99 3.87 99.22 
Utilico Investment Trust Plc 7 0.27 99.49 
Witan Investment Trust Plc 13 0.51 100.00 
Total 2.558 100.00 100.00 
Source: Bankscope (2008) 
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Table 2: Banks and shareholdings by country 
Country 
Number of 
banks 
Number of 
shareholdings 
Average number of 
shareholdings 
per bank 
Germany 36 491 13.64 
France 40 487 12.18 
Spain 14 788 56.29 
Italy 35 927 26.49 
United Kingdom 53 2.558 48.26 
Total 178 5.251 29.50 
Source: Bankscope (2008) 
Table 3: Banks and shareholdings by bank type 
Banktype 
Number of 
banks 
Number of 
shareholdings 
Average number of 
shareholdings 
per bank 
Bank Holding & Holding Company 17 1.133 66.65 
Commercial Bank 62 1.886 30.42 
Cooperative Bank 23 259 11.26 
Investment Bank/ Securities House 27 781 28.93 
Islamic Bank 1 22 22.00 
Medium & Long term Credit Bank 4 137 34.25 
Non-Banking Credit Institution 39 947 24.28 
Real Estate/ Mortgage Bank 5 86 17.20 
Total 178 5.251 29.50 
Source: Bankscope (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of EU directives on takeover activity, investor protection and ownership structure (based on Section 4) 
  Concentrated ownership structure Dispersed ownership structure 
            
  
  
  
Impact on 
takeover 
activity 
Impact on 
minority 
shareholder 
protection 
Impact on 
ownership 
structure 
Impact on 
takeover 
activity 
Impact on 
minority 
shareholder 
protection 
Impact on 
ownership 
structure 
Transparency Directive Fewer M&As Better protection More  Fewer M&As Better protection No impact 
      dispersion       
Shareholder Directive Fewer M&As Better protection More  Fewer M&As Better protection No impact 
      dispersion       
Takeover Directive           
Mandatory bid rule Less trade in Better protection More  Fewer M&As Better protection No impact 
  controlling   concentration      
  blocks           
Squeeze-out rule More M&As Better protection More  More M&As Better protection No impact 
      dispersion       
Sell-out rule Fewer M&As Better protection More  Fewer M&As Better protection No impact 
      dispersion       
Breakthrough rule Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous 
              
Board neutrality rule More M&As Better protection Ambiguous More M&As Better protection No impact 
              
Source: Goergen et al. (2005) and own research. 
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Table 9: Sovereign wealth funds from Asia and the Middle East 
Country Target  Industry Investor Stake 
     
Germany Deutsche Bank AG Banking Government of Dubai via its funds 2.20% 
     
Italy UniCredito Italiano SpA Banking Government of Lybia via its funds 4.23% 
 Capitalia SpA Insurance Government of Lybia via its funds 5.00% 
     
Switzerland UBS AG Banking Government of Singapore via its funds 9.00% 
 Credit Suisse Group AG Banking Government of Qatar via its funds 9.90% 
     
United  Barclays Plc Banking Government of Singapore via its funds 3.10% 
Kingdom Barclays Plc Banking Government of Qatar via its funds 8.90% 
 Barclays Plc Banking Government of China via its funds 3.10% 
 Standard Chartered Plc Banking Government of Singapore via its funds 18.00% 
 Standard Chartered Plc Banking Government of Dubai via its funds 2.70% 
 HSBC Holdings Plc Banking Government of Dubai via its funds 0.50% 
 Chelsfield Partners LLP Real Estate Government of Qatar via its funds 20.00% 
 
London Stock Exchange 
Plc 
Financial 
Infrastructure Government of Qatar via its funds 20.00% 
  
London Stock Exchange 
Plc 
Financial 
Infrastructure Government of Qatar via its funds 28.00% 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2008) and own research. 
Figure 2: Distribution of the largest blockholding in the banking sector of individual 
member countries 
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Source: Bankscope (2008). Note: The horizontal lines indicate the 10 (qualified holding), 25 
(blocking minority), 30 (mandatory bid), 50 (simple majority), 75 (super majority) and 90 percent 
(squeeze-out) threshold. 
31 
